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The impact of National Waste Regimes on Commodity Markets and Free Trade in the EU 
Green protectionism and the 
Need for Harmonisation 
Eine wesentliche Triebkraft der Harmonisierung in der Europäischen Union ist 
die Schaffung eines gemeinsame Binnenmarktes. Umweltpolitische Maßnahmen 
stellen vielfach ein Problem für diese Harmonisierungsprozesse dar. 
Am Beispiel der Verpackungspolitiken Deutschlands und Dänemarks wird 
aufgezeigt, wie die ökologischen Argumente zugleich einen Schutz öko-
nomischer Interessen darstellen. Es wird die These vertreten, daß inzwischen 
letzteres überwiegt und wissenschaftliche Erklärungsversuche wie Ökobilanzen 
hierfür instrumentalisiert werden. Ökonomische Harmonisierungsforderungen 
erscheinen daher gerechtfertigt. 
E
I'öw Nicolas Bnclet 
conomic exchanges - whether in terms of 
trade, investments or mergers and acqui-
sitions - are particularly intense between Euro-
pean Union member states. This intensity is gro-
wing with the ongoing process of European 
integration. Free trade has rapidly become the 
leading principle in this process, even at a wider 
scale than that of the EU, under GATT/WTO. 
Moreover, the main aim of the European Union 
has been since the Treaty of Rome to create a 
single market based on the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and workers and especi-
ally on an undistorted competition within the 
EU. Therefore harmonisation of rules and stan-
dards is one of the main issues of European 
Union legislation, 
The increasing level of economic activities, and 
their expanding geographic scale, are the cause 
of increasing environmental impacts, in particu-
lar those caused by the handhng of increasing 
volumes of waste. National governments develo-
ped policies, and adopted legislation, aimed at 
controlling the environmental effects of waste. 
In this realm, environmental protection has 
become the leading principle. However, many 
measures taken by national governments infrin-
ge, intentionally or not, on the principle of free 
trade. The objective of environmental protection 
is then in conflict with the principle of free tra-
de. 
Our purpose here is not to concentrate on the 
whole question of free trade, but on the part of 
this question involved with consumer products 
and the special case of packaging waste. In this 
domain, the Danish bottle case and the German 
deposit refund system are two examples which 
demonstrate the problem. Both cases had a big 
influence on the setting of a „packaging" direc-
tive (94/62/CE) oftheEU. 
• The Danish case 
In Denmark, the practice of the deposit of bott-
les, in particular for beers and soft drinks, has 
never been interrupted. Already in the sixties, 
an environmental regulation reinforced the 
economic reasons of its existence. Danish au-
thorities, in accordance with existing knowled-
ge and techniques, banned metal cans from the 
domestic market. Given the existing techniques 
and knowledge, they considered the deposit of 
glass bottles as preferable from an environ-
mental point of view. No Danish actors really 
contested the choice. From this time onwards, 
beverage distribution in Denmark distinguishes 
itself from the other European countries. After-
wards, regulations were adopted at the begin-
ning of the eighties in order to stabilise a prac-
tice threatened by the evolution of distribution 
in all industrialised countries. Indeed, globali-
sation of markets induces firms in the beverage 
sector to use one-way packaging. 
By obliging beverage producers to use refill-
able packaging, the regulator perpetuates a 
system considered as overtaken by non-Danish 
multinational firms of the sector, but already 
well integrated in the strategy of Danish firms. 
Firms like Carlsberg and Tuborg, incontestable 
leaders of the Danish market of beer, have not 
ceased to commercialise their production 
destined to the domestic market, with deposi-
ted bottles. At the same time, these firms adap-
ted themselves to their markets for export, and 
sell beer in metal cans. By this way, Danish 
firms maintain the quasi-exclusive control of 
their domestic market while they entered on 
outside markets. 
This situation has been judged inequitable by 
foreign producers and incited them to put pres-
sure on the European Commission to file a com-
plaint, at the European Court of Justice (ECJ), on 
the basis of article 30 of the Treaty of Rome and 
of the respect of free-trade. 
The Commission argued that the incriminated 
regulation constitutes a measure with an effect 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction, which 
cannot be justified by an imperative requirement 
of environmental protection. Furthermore it is a 
measure with discriminatory effects against 
imports. Finally there exists a regulation of the 
EU regarding packaging for liquid foodstuffs. 
The Commission argued that this directive of 
1985 provided the same environmental effec-
tiveness, but with less restrictive means for the 
intra-communitary trade. 
Denmark asserts that it is not the only Member 
State to say that the directive of 1985 does not 
propose the most efficient solutions. The Danish 
system is, according to the national authorities, 
superior as regards the rate of reuse, volume of 
waste, and management costs. Only when an 
alternative solution as efficient as its own is pro-
posed to Denmark, will it accept to revolve the 
legislation on packaging. Furthermore the 
agreement should not obstruct importers and 
foreign producers to enter into the Danish mar-
ket. 
The ECJ stated that „in the absence of a common 
regulation regarding the production and the 
marketing of the concerned products", measu-
res with restrictive consequences on free-trade 
are acceptable, from the moment that it turns 
out that they are „necessary in order to satisfy 
imperative general interest requirements..." 
(1). However, such measures have to be applied 
indistinctly to national and imported products. 
In this particular case, it has been judged that 
„the environmental protection constitutes an 
imperative requirement, which may limit the 
implementation of the article 30 of the treaty". 
The decision of the ECJ of the 20th of September 
1988 proved Denmark to be right in the absen-
ce of a European regulation insuring the same 
level of environmental protection. 
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• The consequences 
We note that the debate on the environmental 
superiority of a system on another is turning 
quite rapidly into a confrontation of divergent 
interests between industrialists. Is environment 
a pretext for protectionism for Denmark? Can 
free-trade, defended by multinational firms, and 
sustained by the European institutions, justify 
the renunciation of a system accepted by the 
majority of the population, and which has pro-
ved in the eyes of a whole country to be positive 
for the environment? 
• ' A game-theoret ic analysis 
It is a game-theoretic scenario and especially the 
measure of the risks of drift, in one sense or 
another, which can help to solve the problem. 
On the one hand, we can wonder if Danish 
brewers would keep the same position regar-
ding deposits if the whole European countries 
adopted the Danish system. It is likely that the 
effect for them would be the loss of market-sha-
res abroad. But the generalisation of the Danish 
system in Europe, only threat likely to generate 
effects with an eventual sentence of the Europe-
an Court of Justice, does not seem credible, 
because it is against the interests of most non-
Danish brewers. In a non-co-operative logic bet-
ween European countries, it seems that the 
game is in favour of Danish brewers. 
The generalisation of the deposit system in Euro-
pe would cost a lot, and the gain of the market 
share of non-Danish brewers would probably 
not compensate such costs. Moreover, Danish 
brewers are interested in maintaining the status 
quo. The order of the sequences of the game is 
not at random. If they want to change the situa-
tion, non-Danish brewers have to move first. But 
wouldn't it be an action, which would penalise 
themselves? Even if Danish brewers would loose 
proportionally more than their competitors, the 
wish of a generalisation of a deposit system 
would have to be justified with the regulator and 
the opinion by environmental arguments. 
If, afterwards, Danish brewers would admit 
having lost the game and also wish the complete 
dismantling of deposit systems in Europe, this 
could not be done without several problems. 
Besides the costs bound to the reorganisation of 
the production process, how can one justify a 
new renunciation of deposit after having sung its 
ecological praises and having pushed its re-
introduction? Which regulator and which opini-
on would accept such a reversal? For such rea-
sons, the big European brewers do not have a 
credible threat, if not through the European insti-
tutions. As, besides, no change in the posi-
tion of the European Court of Justice is con-
ceivable as long as a European directive will not 
prove to be more efficient for domestic waste 
management, we can understand one of the 
important points of the „packaging" directive. 
Such a directive is required in order to prevent 
proliferation of national environmental measures 
which would have the effect of bringing more or 
less intense restrictions to free trade inside the 
European market. The degree of the restrictions 
issued from this type of measure does not need 
to be important. Its impact, as in the Danish case, 
expresses itself as a symbol. The „European 
Commission-Denmark" case has become impor-
tant as a juridical precedent. The protection of 
the environment is promoted to the range of an 
imperative requirement, which can prevail on 
the principle of free trade. As a juridical prece-
dent, it may favour the adoption of other „bar-
riers" to free trade, with high effect this time. 
In fact, after long debates an European packaging 
directive has been installed in 1994 (62/94/CE). 
This directive aims at harmonising national pack-
aging waste management measures, minimising 
environmental impacts of packaging waste and at 
avoiding the erection of barriers to trade within 
the EU. Similar to the German regulation, quotas 
are an important element. 50-65 per cent of 
packaging waste must be recovered (included 
incineration with energy recovery), and 25-45 
per cent of all packaging waste must be recycled 
with at least 15 per cent of each packaging mate-
rial being recycled. In fact, the directive is based 
on the article 100a concerning the single Euro-
pean market and not on the environmental Article 
130s. Industry thus succeeded in making the pro-
tection of free trade the priority. Some more far 
reaching environmental aims were dropped wit-
hin the decision-making process not least becau-
se of the spill-overs (exports) of packaging waste 
by the German DSD system, the second example 
to be considered in the following. 
Nevertheless, there is still controversy if this 
directive is sufficient to fullfill the ECJ's require-
ments of a common regulation, even though the 
Danish system came again under attack after the 
implementation of the packaging directive. 
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• The German system 
of deposit-refund 
The option taken in Germany regarding house-
hold waste management, and particularly on 
beverage packaging, has hurt several industrials, 
mostly foreign firms with commercial interests 
within the country. They consider the measures 
taken (take-back obligation for packaging and 
quota for reflllable) an violation of the free-tra-
de principle established between European 
countries and denounce it as „disguised protec-
tionism". An intense debate has arisen on this 
question between industry, European institutions 
and German public authorities. We will not 
explain the nature of such measures here (2) , 
but rather analyse the conflicts that it raises. 
The provisions concerning beverage packaging 
are often interpreted as „disguised protec-
tionism", aiming to favour small Bavarian bott-
lers and brewers. In this Land, indeed, an 
important number of brewers commercialise 
their products in deposited glass bottles. In 
1991, Bavaria had been the only Land to vote 
against the so called „Verpackungsverordnung", 
because it did not completely prohibit one-way 
packaging for beer, mineral water and milk. 
Foreign producers of beverage do not view the 
legislation on reflllable packaging favourably. 
According to them, it goes against the free-trade 
principle. It would favour local industry to the 
detriment of the others. The case of Evian, which 
sold 43 millions bottles of 1.5 litre in 1988, and 
only 5-9 millions bottles in 1990 (3), illustrates 
quite well the difficulties met by a firm geogra-
phically too far from the market to consider the 
organisation of its own glass bottle deposit 
system. The lack of concern of the German aut-
horities regarding the international consequen-
ces of their waste management system has been 
sharply felt within the European Union. The 
debate on the legitimacy of the German deposit-
refund scheme is still a hot spot, and complaints 
addressed to the ECJ still continue even after the 
adoption of the European directive. 
• Conclusion 
The two examples are the most spectacular 
faced in Europe in the last years. At first sight it 
is a question of conflict between actors concer-
ned with the environment and economic actors, 
or between member states aware of environ-
mental problems and member states not aware. 
Yet, the observation of the two examples shows 
that the firms involved belonging to the coun-
tries having adopted the incriminated systems, 
are maybe their stronger defenders. The opposi-
tion is therefore not environment against eco-
nomy. This is not as surprising as it could seem. 
We have to distinguish two elements regarding 
the cases of measures supported by domestic 
firms against firms from abroad: the genesis of 
the system at the source of the conflict; the mea-
sures taken in a second time in order to protect 
such a system. 
At the origin these systems have been established 
for several reasons. Generally deposit-refund 
schemes were born for economic reasons. 
Firms had interest in refill their own bottles. The 
structure of the market of beverage was essenti-
ally local. In the sixties, this was still the case 
when Denmark introduced the ban on metal and 
aluminium cans for environmental reasons. 
There was surely no intention to introduce a 
measure aiming at protecting the market from 
abroad. The bias came with the evolution of the 
beverage market: an increasing openness to 
producers more and more far from the consu-
mers, thanks to the introduction of packaging 
loosing weight with time. The economic advan-
tage of refilling bottles was disappearing. 
At the beginning of the eighties, deposit-refund 
systems were still alive throughout Europe but to 
a very different degree. The size of the country 
had surely an influence on this. 
Whatever the reasons, in these regions the market 
still left room to deposit-refund schemes and 
local industry has organised itself on this basis. In 
Denmark, added to the ban on metal and alumi-
nium cans, environmental reasons were the main 
foundation of the system. The industry followed, 
organised itself on the basis of the system, and 
reinforced the interest of the country for it, brin-
ging it also on the economic field. Maintaining the 
system therefore also became important from this 
last point of view. The various measures, aiming at 
protecting a threatened system, came during the 
eighties for economic reasons, while no Life Cycle 
Analysis (LCA) was really able to assert of the 
superiority of the system. 
In Germany also, economic reasons are at the 
root of the 1988 order introducing the 72 percent 
quota of reflllable. It is maybe even more clear 
than in Denmark. Bavarian retailers and the 
important local industry of beer feared for their 
own interests. They are now insured of the stabi-
lity of a situation, which allows them to survive in 
front of the biggest food and drink companies. 
The debate continues on the ground of environ-
mental arguments, each part arguing with the 
results of LCAs and of other methods in order to 
support their own position. The controversy on 
LCAs is far from being closed. In the end, it is 
most of all a question of social preferences, 
which has to be expressed also on a non ratio-
nal basis. A region in Europe still has the possi-
bility to defend its own deposit-refund schemes, 
thanks to the subsistence of scientific controver-
sy (4). Yet, we should be aware that the main 
stake is now economic and that environment is 
instrumentahsed by economic interests. 
References 
(1) This argument follows the lines of the famous „cassis 
de Dijon" judgement of the ECJ. 
(2) See Budet N., Godard 0 (eds.): Municipal Waste 
Management in Europe: A Comparative Study in Regime 
Building, ed. Kluwer, Dordrecht/London, forthcoming. 
(3) The fall of sales can be explained by the introduction, 
in 1988, of an obligatory deposit of 0.25 ECU on one-way 
plastic bottles, which have to be taken back by the retail 
sector and have to be re-used or recycled by the distribu-
tors. Because big retailers did not want to establish a 
second system in order to take back one-way bottles, they 
stopped in 1989 and 1990 to sell them. The situation 
evolved with the order of 1991 which imposed a general 
objective to the beverage sector (at least 72 percent of 
bottles have to be refilled) and not an objective for every 
brand sold on the market. The compulsory deposit of 0.25 
ECU does not exist anymore. 
For further details on the Evian case, see 
Budet. N.: Politiques d'environnement, trajectoires institu-
tionnelles et contraintes de coordination internationale: le 
cas des déchets d'emballages ménagers en Europe, Thèse 
de doctorat, Université Paris VII, 1997. 
(4) Godard 0.: Stratégies industrielles et conventions d'en-
vironnement: de l'univers stabilisé aux univers controver-
sés. Congrès international „Environnement et économie: de 
l'univers stabilisé aux univers controversés", Ministère de 
l'Environnement, INSEE, IFEN, Paris, 15-16 Février 1993. 
j g f 
Der Autor 
0r. Nicolas Budet ist Forscher am International Cent-
re for Research on Environment and Development 
(CIRED), Paris. 
Kontakt: CIRED, 45 bis Avenue de la Belle Gabrielle 
Jardin Tropical, F-94736 Nagent-sur-Marne Cedex, 
Tel. 0033-1-439473-73, Fax -70, 
E-mail: budet@centre-cired.fr 
2 2 Ökologisches W irtschaften 4/1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 2010 Authors; licensee IÖW and oekom verlag. This is an article distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivates License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited. 
